Muslims in Liberal Democracies: Why the West Fears Islam

Jocelyne Cesari, Harvard University

Qantara.de, November 2013

Harvard professor and Islam expert Jocelyne Cesari looks into the mechanisms of the West's fear of Islam, and ponders on how the dominant narrative that tends to present Islam as an alien religion can be countered

The integration of Muslim immigrants has been on the political agenda of European democracies for several decades. However, only in the last ten years has it specifically evolved into a question of civic integration closely related to religious identity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the socio-economic integration of immigrants with a Muslim background was the primary focus of academic literature, but with the emergence of the second and third generations, the interest has shifted to political mobilization. Beginning with the Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom and the hijab affair in France from 1989 to present, the spotlight has moved to the legitimacy of Islamic signs in public space, such as dress code, minarets, and halal foods.

As a consequence, controversies surrounding the visibility of these signs have steadily grown. Controversy is not merely a disagreement about divergent points of view; but it is about fundamental differences (or at least perceived as such) about the principles and norms that regulate the common life of individuals sharing the same time period. Such fundamental divergences that lead to exclusive or binary positions cannot coexist in the same public space.

Islam and the perceived rejection of democracy

Consequently, headscarves, mosques, and minarets are increasingly seen as a rejection of western democratic values, or even worse, as a direct threat to the West.

During the 2006 campaign to ban minarets in Switzerland, posters from the Egerkinger Committee displayed a woman in a burqa standing next to minarets that were rising from a Swiss flag and pointing to the sky like missiles (see picture). Such a perception of Islam in the public sphere has reached the United States as well through the ongoing Shari'a debates, discourse on Islamic radicalization in jails, and the ground zero mosque controversy in the summer of 2010.

Islamic signs are not only ostracized in public discourse, but are also controlled and restricted through multiple legal and administrative procedures in an attempt to "civilize" or adjust the signs to fit western political cultures. In April 2011, the French government enforced the ban on wearing the niqab or burqa, which was overwhelmingly approved in 2010 by the French legislature. Other countries like Belgium and The Netherlands have followed the French path in 2011 and 2012.

The most recent addition to the long list of outcast Islamic signs is circumcision. In June 2012, a judge in Cologne, Germany, outlawed circumcision on the grounds that it causes "illegal bodily harm". Although Germany's Chancellor Merkel has promised the Muslim and Jewish communities that they can continue practicing circumcision, the legal implications of this ban have yet to be determined.

Cultural struggle within Islam

This cultural struggle is also fought on the Muslim side. Salafism, a specific interpretation of Islam in stark opposition to western values and cultures, advocates many practices such as gender segregation and rejection of political and civic engagement that are deemed as efforts to fight the impurity of the West. This particular brand of Islam is one of the most visible, widespread, and accessible interpretations, and thus gives the illusion to both Muslims and non-Muslims that Salafism is the true Islam.

In sum, an essentialized West and an essentialized Islam are fighting each other and in so doing reinforce one another. The "burqa versus the bikini" opposition often used by both Islamophobes and Muslim fundamentalists encapsulates this sense of profound incompatibility that relates to politics, lifestyles, and most interestingly, women's bodies.

On one hand, for most westerners, the burqa symbolizes total denial of freedom and of gender equality. On the other hand, for fundamentalist religious voices, the burqa symbolizes woman's dignity and her devotion to family values, opposed to the bikini seen as an objectification and degradation of the female body.

Such stark oppositions are of course extreme, but at the same time, reflect the "either or" approach, in which most of the discourse on Islam is currently trapped. The German President, Joachim Gauck involuntarily illustrated the milder version of this binary opposition, when he said that Muslims can live in Germany but that, unlike his predecessor (Christian Wulf), he does not think that Muslims can be part of Germany.

Polarized mindset

One major consequence of such a polarized mindset is to mask the sociological reality of Muslims. In fact, a striking gap exists between the image of Islam as it is constructed in binary public discourse and the multifaceted reality of Muslims across countries and localities.

For example, the dominant assumption is that visible Islamic identities in the West are inversely correlated to their civic and political loyalties, while there is empirical evidence that contradicts such an assumption.

My book – "Why the West Fears Islam – An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies" – presents first-hand data from focus groups I organized in Paris, London, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Boston between 2007 and 2010. In this regard, it is the first systematic and comparative review of the existing knowledge about Muslim political behaviours and religious practices in western Europe and in the United States.

The major conclusion is that although Muslims are challenged by their secular environment, they do not experience the incompatibility so intensely debated by western politicians and Salafi preachers alike. Then why is Islam depicted as an obstacle in political discourse and the media? Taking up this intriguing gap, I have attempted to make sense of this disjuncture between what Muslims do and the political construct of the "Muslim problem".

During this exploration, liberalism and secularism have appeared as the two major idioms used to make sense of the Muslim presence.

1. Contextualizing Liberalism

The "Islamic Problem" in Europe is a consequence of immigrant settlement that in the last two decades has been phrased in cultural and religious terms. The fact that Muslims stand at the core of three major social "problems" – immigration; class and economic integration; ethnicity and multiculturalism – has increased the concern about Islamic religion, increasingly seen as the major reason for all problems.

I show in my book that in the United States this culturalization of all political issues related to Muslims is more recent and primarily related to security concerns. Therefore, categories of "immigrant" and "Muslim" overlap in Western Europe, unlike in the United States where immigration debates centre on economic and social concerns such as wages, assimilation, and language.

The outcome of these social shifts is visible in the apocalyptic turn of the public rhetoric on Islam in Europe. Extreme right political figures like Geert Wilders speak of "the lights going out over Europe" or of "the sheer survival of the West".

It would be misleading to think that this existential war is waged only on the margins of European societies. In fact, numerous opinions surveys as well as political discourses show that the perception of Islam as a danger to Western core political values is shared across political allegiances and nations.

2. The Alliance of Liberalism and Feminism

In fact, this existential war can be defined as a values-centred liberalism which pitches itself against the recognition of religious and cultural diversity. For example, British Prime Minister David Cameron declared in February 2011 at the annual Munich Security Conference of world leaders: "Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism."

It is important to emphasize that, historically, political liberalism at the foundation of Western democracies is not necessarily incompatible with the recognition of pluralism. Based on the principle of toleration, the liberal State is traditionally expected to grant equality to citizens of all religious and cultural backgrounds.

In contrast, the new liberal discourse sees recognition of minority rights as a threat to freedom of expression and women's rights which are apprehended as the core values of national communities. Hence, it advocates a strong cultural integration of newcomers. As a consequence it has created very significant policy shifts in countries usually characterized by multiculturalism like the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. For example, the multicultural project of recognition of "cultural diversity in a context of mutual tolerance" of Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966 is now strongly criticized. In fact, the new political consensus is to prioritize strong cultural assimilation to British values over minority rights.

The markers of European identity

This "new integrationist" discourse is widely shared across European countries and, interestingly, promoted by former left-wing activists. Gender equality and rejection of religious authority, which were primary left-wing topics of struggle in the 1960s have become in the present decade the legitimate markers of European identity. In these conditions, all groups and individuals are required to demonstrate conformity to these liberal values in order to become legitimate members of national communities. The "Moderate Muslims" label serves this purpose. It creates a distinction that is supposedly not based on Islam as such but on the adherence of Muslims to liberal values.

Strikingly, feminist groups have become key actors of this discourse. Some feminist figures have been particularly vehement against group rights and especially against any Islamic principles that could undermine gender equality. Curiously, this feminist discourse silences the Muslim women that it purports to defend. As a consequence, Muslim women are transformed into subalterns in a way that is similar to the colonial and postcolonial vision of the Muslim subject.

This new integrationist discourse goes hand in hand with states' active policies to transform the behaviours and identities of their Muslim citizens. For example, state-led production of Muslim subjects with the correct moral identity is reflected in various policies: values tests and oaths of allegiance for would-be migrants and citizens; recruitment of "moderate Muslims" as state-sponsored role models and community leaders; formal and informal restrictions of Islamic practices seen as extremist or illiberal.

All these policies can be summed up as an attempt to civilize the "enemy". Such a project is not only a speech act but translates into discreet or invisible regulations/ limitations on Muslim cultural and social practices. Interestingly, most Muslims we interviewed reveal that they are already "civilized" and are trying to find commonality with the dominant group. Most of the time, however, they are silenced or reduced to the reification of their bodies, dress, or minarets.

Being Muslim and a citizen

One of our most striking findings is the non-contentious nature of being a Muslim and a citizen, while it is this exact dichotomy that puts Muslims at odds with the social expectations of most Europeans. Our surveys show that Muslims do not see incompatibility between being a Muslim and being a citizen.

At the core of the European shift is the blind spot of the social legitimacy of religion that has been completely eliminated from most of national discourse and values.

In sum, the symbolic integration of Muslims within national communities would require a dramatic change in the current liberal and secularist narratives. It is a daunting task, but it can be done.

On March 10, 2011, the hearings of the Congress Commission on Radicalization of American Muslims provided a platform for at least two individuals to weave Muslims into the American narrative. In his testimony, Congressman Keith Ellison (D-MN), the first Muslim elected to Congress, tearfully etched into America's consciousness the story of Salman Ahmad, a Muslim paramedic and New York police cadet killed trying to help fellow New Yorkers on 9/11. Additionally, Congressman Brian Higgins, a Catholic, stated that America's tradition is "Christian-Judeo-Islamic," not simply "Christian-Judeo".

This can be seen as empty feel-good talk, but it can also be the prefiguration of how historical references can be used to achieve symbolic integration and counter the dominant narrative that tends to present Islam as an alien religion.

Jocelyne Cesari, Senior Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University, Director of the Islam in the West Program, Harvard University

http://en.qantara.de/content/muslims-in-liberal-democracies-why-the-west-fears-islam

Multiple Paths to Modernity

RESET DOC

www.resetdoc.org

September 2012

Each cultural and denominational tradition, including Islam and other religions, is susceptible to lead to an internal elaboration of its own democratic and pluralist approach to modernity. Four leading scholars explain how and why this happens.

Whither Democracy? Religion, Politics and Islam

Fred Dallmayr

Turkey, Secularism and the EU. A View from Damascus

Sadik J. Al-Azm

Religion, Unity and Diversity

Ibrahim Kalin

Democracy and Islam

Irfan Ahmad

Sacralization of the State, Secular Nationalism, and Civil Religion: The Case of Turkey

Talip Kucukcan

Marmara University, Istanbul

The George Washington International Law Review

Vol 41, 2011

This Article will illustrate how secular nationalism has been introduced as a source of collective identity and as a founding ideology of the Turkish state vis-a-vis the Islamic legacy of the Ottoman Empire. This Article will also locate religion in the process of laying the foundations of civil religion and examine how religion has been sidelined, marginalized, and reconfigured by the state ideology. Finally, in the context of Turkey-EU relations, this Article will analyze how the Turkish state has repositioned itself with regard to Islam, non-Muslims, and freedom of religion.

I. SACRALIZATION OF SECULAR NATIONALISM

...

II. INCORPORATION OF RELIGION IN THE STATE

...

III. CONCLUSION

Turkey as a majority Muslim country by population and a secular state by constitution presents a unique case study as far as de-establishment of Islam and its institutions on the one hand, and sacralization of the state through legal reforms, political changes, educational activities, and establishment of new institutions on the other hand. Foundations of civil religion were carefully planned and laid down in the formative period of the Republic, and secular figures, symbols, myths, and institutions were construed. Although the state gradually declared itself a secular entity, religion has been incorporated into the state machinery by the establishment of a state-controlled institution. This top-down elite construction and imposition of civil religion through the power and institutions of the state have been a constant source of tension in Turkish society, and this will remain so for a long time if Turkey does not push forward with democratization to open up space for religion in the public sphere.

Full-text, available at:

http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwilr/PDFs/41-4/JLE413.pdf

Sufi Bodies: Religion and Society in Medieval Islam

Shahzad Bashir, Stanford University

Columbia University Press, 2011

Between 1300 and 1500 C.E. a new form of Sufi Islam took hold among central Islamic peoples, joining individuals through widespread networks resembling today’s prominent paths and orders. Understanding contemporary Sufism requires a sophisticated analysis of these formative years. Moving beyond a straight account of leaders and movements, Shahzad Bashir weaves a rich history around the depiction of bodily actions by Sufi masters and disciples, primarily in Sufi literature and Persian miniature paintings of the period.

Focusing on the Persianate societies of Iran and Central Asia, Bashir explores medieval Sufis’ conception of the human body as the primary shuttle between interior (batin) and exterior (zahir) realities. Drawing on literary, historical, and anthropological approaches to corporeality, he studies representations of Sufi bodies in three personal and communal arenas: religious activity in the form of ritual, asceticism, rules of etiquette, and a universal hierarchy of saints; the deep imprint of Persian poetic paradigms on the articulation of love, desire, and gender; and the reputation of Sufi masters for working miracles, which empowered them in all domains of social activity. Bashir’s novel perspective illuminates complex relationships between body and soul, body and gender, body and society, and body and cosmos. It highlights love as an overarching, powerful emotion in the making of Sufi communities and situates the body as a critical concern in Sufi thought and practice. Bashir’s work ultimately offers a new methodology for extracting historical information from religious narratives, especially those depicting extraordinary and miraculous events.

REVIEWS

"This is an excellent work that is a must read for anyone interested in the history of Sufism, the history of Iran and Central Asia, the role of the body in Islam, and the nature of religious authority in Islamic society. A superb book that is not at all likely to be replaced as an authoritative source for many years to come." — Jamal Elias, University of Pennsylvania

"Sufi Bodies is an innovative treatment of Sufi materials that will find a large readership not only in the field of Sufism but also more broadly in the fields of comparative mysticism, religious studies, and the history of sexuality. A paradigm shifting book that is a pleasure to read." — Kathryn Babayan, University of Michigan

"Sufi Bodies provides a very useful, alternative view of Sufi issues, such as love and discipleship, that are often treated in abstract and ethereal—in a word, disembodied—terms. It will prove valuable for a range of audiences and courses." — Marion Katz, New York University"

In Sufi Bodies, Shahzad Bashir, like a litterateur turned detective, exhumes and examines the hidden physicality of premodern Persian Sufism. From food and women to grave sites, he weaves a tapestry of connections to the social and intellectual world of Sufis, with emotive, affective and spiritual messages registered through the body and bodily activities. At once forensic and lyrical, this book provides an interior journey that is inseparable from its external traces in the literary treasure of Sufi adepts. It both complements and exceeds other studies of a pivotal period in Islamic spirituality." — Bruce B. Lawrence, Duke University

Excerpt:

http://cup.columbia.edu/bookpreview/978-0-231-14490-2/

http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-14490-2/sufi-bodies

Secularism: America, France and Turkey in Comparative Perspective

Ahmet T. Kuru, San Diego State University

Cambridge University Press, 2009

Why do secular states pursue different policies toward religion? This book provides a generalizable argument about the impact of ideological struggles on the public policy making process, as well as a state-religion regimes index of 197 countries. More specifically, it analyzes why American state policies are largely tolerant of religion, whereas French and Turkish policies generally prohibit its public visibility, as seen in their bans on Muslim headscarves. In the United States, the dominant ideology is "passive secularism," which requires the state to play a passive role, by allowing public visibility of religion. Dominant ideology in France and Turkey is "assertive secularism," which demands that the state play an assertive role in excluding religion from the public sphere. Passive and assertive secularism became dominant in these cases through certain historical processes, particularly the presence or absence of an ancien régime based on the marriage between monarchy and hegemonic religion during state-building periods.

Excerpt

View excerpt as PDF (153 KB)

Table of Contents

1. Analyzing secularism: history, ideology, and policy

Part I. The United States:

2. Passive secularism and the Christian right's challenge (1981–2008)

3. Religious diversity and the evolution of passive secularism (1776–1981)

Part II. France:

4. Assertive secularism and the multiculturalist challenge (1989–2008)

5. The war of two Frances and the rise of assertive secularism (1789–1989)

Part III. Turkey:

6. Assertive secularism and the Islamic challenge (1997–2008)

7. Westernization and the emergence of assertive secularism (1826–1997)

Reviews

"Professor Kuru's authoritative study, written with remarkable precision, asks taboo-breaking questions and provides iconoclastic responses to them in strict accordance with the maxim facta non verba. First, it shatters the deeply internalized myth that Turkish laïcité is unquestionably sui generis and thus cannot be compared with any other case. Second, it rebuffs the widely accepted premise that Islam and secularism are inherently incompatible, and that assertive secularism would therefore be the only working model for Muslim societies. Third, it clearly shows that in its application of assertive secularism Turkey has gone far beyond its historical model, the French laïcité of the Third Republic. This exemplary piece of scholarship further offers invaluable insight into the present-day tug-of-war over secularism in Turkey." - M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Princeton University

"Kuru's work speaks to a wide audience. Substantively, it explains both the formation and policy consequences of various forms of secularism, which should interest scholars and students of a wide array of subjects. With a precise analytical framework and engaging historical narrative, it introduces the relevance of ideology to the study of religion and politics. It also combines deductive theory witha rich empirical analysis that is sensitive to the historical context. This book deserves high praise for managing to cross so many boundaries in such a sophisticated manner." - Middle East Policy

"...Kuru demonstrates that much can be gleaned from further study of these three constitutionally secular cases. Secularism and State Policies Towards Religion sets a new standard for such studies and should be required reading for anyone interested in the relationship between religion and state.... While Kuru focuses on three states, his theoretical framework is potentially applicable to a wider range of states. I believe the significance of this contribution will be seen in future studies of the role of religion in government policy in which I expect this book to become a required citation." - Jonathan Fox, Bar Ilan University, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion

"Kuru's... book is original, scholarly, and wide-ranging, lifting the account of the relationship between religion and politics in Turkey out of the normal single-country context or the simpler comparison with other Muslim societies. Readers whose main interest in the Turkish or Muslim context may be inclined to skip the chapters on the United States and France, but by doing so they will miss an important part of the book which should be illuminating reading for anyone concerned with the role of religion in modern democracies." - William Hale, School of Oriental and African Studies, Middle East Journal

"I recommend this book highly to anyone interested in church-state issues, or in the comparative study of religion and politics. Students of American politics could learn from the book as well, since it puts contemporary US church-state debates in a broader context." - Clyde Wilcox, Georgetown University, Journal of Church and State

"Professor Kuru's book is, no doubt, a major contribution to the international literature on the subject, as well as being a much-needed scholarly contribution to the current debates in Turkey, which often presents a picture of a dialogue of the deaf." Ergun Özbudun, Bilkent University, Insight Turkey

"Relying on an extensive list of legal and political documents, interviews with political elites, and existing research sources.... Kuru has produced an impressive body of research. He has shown effectively that ideology can shape preferences and frame debates.... Secularism and State Policies toward Religion helps us understand both the origins and consequences of the variety of secular states and the policies that result." - Roger Finke, Penn State University, Contemporary Sociology

"Secularism and State Policies toward Religion is a very well-written, well-organized, well-argued and easy-to-read book on an important and difficult topic: it is a comparative in-depth analysis of three different regimes of secularism." - Menderes Çınar, Başkent University, New Perspectives on Turkey

"Kuru's book is a priceless contribution to the cutting-edge debate on state–religion interaction... [It] is the best comparative book that has been published recently on contested state attitudes and policies toward religion... The book succeeds in incorporating an extremely nuanced understanding of each of the three cases without losing terminological clarity, analytical consistency, and theoretical depth." - Berna Turam, Northeastern University, International Journal of Middle East Studies

http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item2427811/Secularism%20and%20State%20Policies%20toward%20Religion/?site_locale=en_US

Catholicism's Lessons for Muslim Democracies?

The Wilson Quarterly

March 2011

In 2008, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) narrowly missed being outlawed. State prosecutors argued that the conservative AKP—whose official platform includes economic modernization and EU membership—was bent on Islamizing the secular state and moving toward theocracy. Some may see the AKP as the model of a Muslim party, appealing to believers while playing by democracy’s rules, but many others within Turkey and elsewhere continue to fear that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Concerns that religion and democracy do not mix aren’t new, writes Princeton political theorist Jan-Werner Müller, nor are they confined to Islam. In the 19th century and far into the 20th, Catholicism was the big worry. Many blamed Catholicism for “the persistence of dictatorship in Latin America and on the Iberian Peninsula” and believed that Catholic citizens’ deepest loyalties lay with the Vatican. (Memorably, this was a big issue for Catholic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy in 1960.) Yet in the latter half of the 20th century, Christian Democratic parties (generally Catholic-based) informed by “select doctrinal values” but respectful of the church-state divide flourished in Western Europe and to an extent in Latin America. Couldn’t Islam chart a similar course?

Many in the West object that this analogy is false. Some argue that European Catholics only embraced democracy on orders from the Vatican—and Muslims have no similar central institution. Others hold that the character of Christian Democratic ideas wasn’t any more instrumental in Catholics’ eventual political integration than a “specifically Muslim style of democracy” might be, because it is “the structure of democratic inclusion, not the distinctive ideas that inform it, that leads to moderation.”

Don’t be so fast to dismiss the Catholic parallel, says Müller. First, Europe’s newly formed Christian Democratic parties were hardly puppets of the Vatican, which often did not approve of their creation, control their leadership, or condone their left-veering programs. The Vatican endorsed democracy “only after decades of Christian Democratic practice.”

Instead, Müller argues, Christian doctrine did indeed inspire Catholicism’s turn toward democracy. The ideas of French philosopher Jacques Maritain provide one good example. Beginning in the 1930s, he developed an array of arguments that embraced democracy and human rights as Christian ideals. Though Christian Democracy’s “astounding electoral successes” owed a lot to its firm anticommunist stance and other factors, they were aided by an ideology that tacked between believers’ spiritual values and nonbelievers’ need for “assurance that religiously inspired parties would not abandon state neutrality in religious affairs once in power.”

Whether such a path is available to Islam is an open question, Müller concedes. What the Catholic example does show is that “the formation of some liberalized Islam by self-consciously moderate and democratic Muslim intellectuals should not be seen as a sideshow.” Debates among Muslims about the role of sharia in state law and the thinking of such polarizing figures as scholar Tariq Ramadan may cause alarm, but they are important for developing a hospitable foundation for democracy. And in entering the push-and-pull democratic arena, Muslim parties will inevitably be forced to adapt religious precepts and traditions, Müller argues, a fact that “blanket condemnations of Islam as incompatible with democracy overlook.”

...

http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/blog/index.cfm/In_Essence/2011/3/7/catholicisms-lessons-for-islam

“Making Muslim Democracies” by Jan-Werner Müller, in The Boston Review, Nov.-Dec. 2010.

Making Muslim Democracies

Jan-Werner Müller

In the summer of 2008, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP) narrowly escaped being banned by the country’s constitutional court. State prosecutors had alleged that the party which is officially committed to economic modernization, conservative moral values, and Turkey’s admission to the European Union was trying to breach the country’s notoriously strict separation of religion and politics, slowly Islamicize the state, and ultimately introduce theocracy.

Many local supporters of the AKP breathed a sigh of relief after the decision, as did non-Muslims who see the AKP as the prototype of a Muslim Democratic party that can appeal to believers while being fully committed to the rules (and values) of the democratic game.

At the same time, loud voices proclaiming that Islam and democracy are incompatible remain in Turkey, and, of course, are not limited to it. Their pronouncements are reminiscent of what many secular liberals in nineteenth-century Europe had to say about democracy and religion, though with an important and instructive twist: back then,Catholicism was deemed an insurmountable obstacle to liberal democracy. Leading French Republican Léon Gambetta famously exclaimed “Le cléricalisme, voilà l’ennemi!” in 1877. In fact, far into the twentieth century prominent politicians and social scientists asserted that Catholicism explained the persistence of dictatorship in Latin America and on the Iberian Peninsula. Catholicism, in the words of Seymour Martin Lipset, appeared “antithetical to democracy”; Pierre Trudeau claimed that Catholic countries

are authoritarian in spiritual matters; and since the dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal may be very fine or even confused, they are often disinclined to seek solutions in temporal affairs through the mere counting of heads.

And as with Muslims today, Catholic citizens were suspected of maintaining transnational ties and ultimate loyalties to spiritual institutions elsewhere—a suspicion that still mattered in John F. Kennedy’s election campaigns.

Yet during the second half of the twentieth century, Christian—which mainly meant Catholic—Democratic parties emerged and flourished in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. These were—and in some degree remain—moderately religious parties. They advance political programs infused with select doctrinal values while firmly upholding democratic structures and respecting the separation of state and church.

...

For full-text: http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.6/muller.php/

Jan-Werner Müller, author of the forthcoming Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe, teaches politics at Princeton University.

Religion and Work Ethic Values: The Case of Turkey

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION OVER WORK ETHIC VALUES:

The Case of Islam and Turkish SME Owner-Managers

Selçuk Uygur, Phd Thesis, 2009

Brunel University, London

Abstract:

The aim of this thesis is to explore the influence of religion on the work ethic values of small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) owner-managers in Turkey. The emergence of religious/pious business people in Turkey has been regarded as a phenomenon. This research pays special attention to the religious transformation and secularism in Turkey. It is based on semi-structured qualitative interviews with 32 Turkish SME owner-managers. The sample of the study has been divided into two groups: The practicing Muslim Turkish managers (the religious group), and non/less practicing Muslim Turkish managers (the secular group).

Discourse analysis of the qualitative data, first, clarifies where to seek the religious influence on business activities. It indicates that the influence of religion should be sought within individuals‘ conduct/manner of living leading the moral values and the mentalities of the business people, rather than seeking cause and affect relationship. The contemporary Islamic interpretation in Turkey, as it is called Turkish/Anatolian interpretation of Islam, is found to re-shape the existing teachings of the religion and reproduce the religious structure through the practices. In this respect, five distinguishing characteristics emerged as signs of the religious influence behind the pious business people‘s actions: Hard work as an Islamic duty, good will (intention), responsibility, bounty/benevolence and the balance/equilibrium in one‘s life. It is also observed that the new Islamic discourse in Turkey provides moral energy exclusively for the religious business people in terms of influencing and encouraging entrepreneurial activities.

Meanwhile, the study demonstrates that the work ethic values of the religious Turkish SME owner-managers have been evolving to be more rational and professional, especially after the 1980s liberal economy. This transformation has been evaluated within the concept of secularisation.

Concluding Remarks

It could be concluded that Turkey has entered a healthier modernization process which seems as a road of no return by making the peace between Islam and modernity. It seems that after more than a century of soul-searching‘ has settled upon the idea of re-producing traditional values within the contemporary framework. In the context of this research, the newly emergent business class appears as the carrier of this transformation process. In particular, it has been observed that Turkey‘s new entrepreneurs have been re-shaping their mentalities towards business activities and re-producing the existing work-related values and ethics. Max Weber regards this ethical transformation (Protestantization) as the fundamental prerequisite of an extensive development process, and calls it the spirit‘ of Western capitalism. In this respect, Turkey has been experiencing a similar process in the context of Islam. In terms of being worldly, the secularization of Islam is attempting to provide its own view on several aspects of modern life, including business ethics.

The findings of this research give the impression that Islam, in a Turkish context, has considerable potential to contribute new angles to the modern capitalist system. This moderate view of Islam, which does not contradict with free market or liberal economy, seems to have promising views on business ethics beyond the Western perspective. In a way, it can potentially create new views of capitalism.

Overall, the assimilation of liberal values and being articulated to the modern world makes us optimistic about the future of Turkey. Regardless of the level of religiousness, this tendency seems to be shared by the majority of the society. This study regards secularization of Islam as the catalyst of this broad tendency. In this respect, the new‘ work ethic, which is re-producing the tradition based on a rational way of thinking, could play a vital role in creating a strong enterprise culture in Turkey. Additionally, it can be claimed that this development will make Turkey‘s hand stronger in the EU accession process.

Full-text of the PhD Thesis (pdf, 257 pages) is available at:

http://dspace.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/4396/1/Selcuk%20Uygur_PhD%20Thesis.pdf

Interview with Olivier Roy on 'Islam in Europe'

New Perspectives Quarterly / Summer 2010

Oliviér Roy talked recently to Eren Gvercin about issues central to the debate about Islam in Europe, from revolutionary milleniarism to Muslim Lutheranism. Roy’s recent books include Islam Confronts Secularism and Globalized Islam.

NPQ | The Swiss majority voted for a ban on minarets; France and Belgium are deep in debate about banning headscarves. In Germany, too, the debate about Islam often verges on hysteria. Why are Europeans so preoccupied with religious symbols and “foreign” religions?

Oliviér Roy | The debate in Europe has shifted in the past 25 years from immigration to the visible symbols of Islam. Which means that even people who oppose immigration now acknowledge that the second and third generations of migrants are here to stay and that Islam has put down roots in Europe. And the debate has made a peculiar shift: while the anti-immigration position used to be associated primarily with the conservative right, Islam is now under attack from both left and right, but for very different reasons. The right believes that Europe is Christian and that Islam should be tolerated, but as an inferior religion. While the constitutional principle of freedom of religion prevents it from banning Islam, it takes every opportunity to limit its visibility; the European Court of Human Rights, for example, did not step in to stop France banning the headscarf in schools.

The left argues for secularism, women’s rights and against fundamentalism: It opposes the veil not so much because it is Islamic but because it seems to contradict women’s rights. So, as we see, behind the Islam debate are far more complicated issues: European identity and the role of religion in Europe. Although the left and right take very different stances on these issues, we are seeing the rise of new populist movements (such as Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands) which combine the two approaches, essentially siding with the right but using the arguments of the left.

NPQ | You have said that fundamentalist groups like al-Qaida have nothing to do with Islamic tradition. But in Europe the fundamentalist ideology is regarded as the essence of the traditional thinking. How do you explain this contradiction?

Roy | The sort of terrorism practiced by al-Qaida has neither a Muslim nor a Christian history. It is an entirely new phenomenon. If we consider its manifestations —suicide bombing, killing hostages, targeting civilians—these are all methods that were used before al-Qaida by other organizations: the Tamil Tigers, for example used suicide attacks; the extreme right in Italy was responsible for the Bologna bombing in August, 1980; and the al-Qaida video footage of the execution of foreign hostages in Iraq is a one-to-one “re-enactment” of the execution of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, with the organization’s banner and logo in the background, the hostage handcuffed and blindfolded, the mock “trial” with the reading of the “sentence” and the execution. Al-Qaida’s modus operandi and organization, the declared enemy of US imperialism, the recruitment of young Muslims educated in the West or converts to Islam, all this indicates clearly that al-Qaida is not the expression of traditional Islam or even fundamentalist Islam—it is a new understanding of Islam, cloaked in Western revolutionary ideology.

NPQ | How do you explain the success of such radical movements or ideologies? Is it really linked to poverty and marginalization?

Roy | No. No research has indicated any correlation between poverty and radicalization. There are far more Saudis than Bangladeshis in radical Islamic movements; in fact there are almost no militant Bangladeshis. I think that the current struggle is a continuation of the old confrontation between anti-imperialist movements based in the Third World with the West and specifically the US. Osama bin Laden says comparatively little about religion, but he does talk about Che Guevara, colonialism, climate change etc. Al-Qaida is obviously a generational movement, it is made up of young people who have distanced themselves from their families and their social surroundings and who are not even interested in their country of origin. Al-Qaida has an astonishing number of converts among its members, a fact which is recognized but has not received sufficient attention. The converts are rebels without a cause who, thirty years ago, would have joined the Red Army Faction (RAF) or the Red Brigades, but who now opt for the most successful movement on the anti-imperialist market. They are still in the tradition of a mostly Western revolutionary millenarianism that has turned its back on the idea of establishing a new and just society. The new movements are profoundly skeptical about building an ideal society, which explains the suicidal dimension also present in the RAF.

NPQ | Some Europeans maintain that European culture is essentially a Christian culture, and that everything Islamic is problematic and alien for Europe. What do you say to this?

Roy | They say this at the same time as Pope Benedict XVI, like John Paul II before him, is reprimanding Europe for rejecting and ignoring its Christian roots. The debate about sexual freedom, abortion, or gay rights is not a confrontation between Europeans and Muslims but between secularists on the one hand—who also exist in the Muslim community—and conservative believers on the other, whether they be Muslims, Catholics or Orthodox Jews. Europe is deeply divided about its own culture: secularists consider the Enlightenment (with its human rights, freedom, democracy) to be the true birth certificate of Europe, while certain Christian-oriented factions believe that the Enlightenment also led to communism, atheism and even Nazism.

NPQ | Is there a risk of Islamophobia becoming a European reality?

Roy | This, too, is a question of how we define Islamophobia. Is it just another definition for racism, and specifically racism against people with Muslim names, whatever their religious standing? Or is it the rejection of a religion? There are militant anti-racists who are against the veil—among the feminists, for example—and there are racists who think the veil is irrelevant because they regard Muslims as quintessentially other. What makes this so untenable is the lack of distinction between ethnicity and religion. Of course, the great majority of European Muslims originate from other cultures, but the connection between ethnic background and religion is dissolving—with Europeans converting to Islam and Muslims converting to Christianity. There are atheist “Arabs” and “Turks” and more and more Muslims want to be acknowledged as members of a faith community, but not necessarily as members of a non-European cultural community. We need to distinguish between “ethnic communities” and “faith communities,” because these are different phenomena which need to be approached in differed ways.

NPQ | How should politics deal with these globalized religions which have drifted away from their cultures?

Roy | I think that it is precisely these religions—rather than established institutions like the Catholic Church—that are most “successful” nowadays. It does not make sense to fight this trend, particularly in countries where freedom of religion is written into the constitution. On the contrary, we must shore up the separation of church and state by ensuring full religious equality—not in the sense of religious “multiculturalism” but with an eye to the conditions under which a faith community can freely exercise its rights—with a neutral and clearly defined form of religious freedom within the framework of existing laws.

NPQ | The media frequently promotes a dialectic of “liberal” vs. “radical” Islam. What is your opinion on this terminology and the value judgement it implies?

Roy | I do not think that a believer needs to chose a “liberal” interpretation of his religion to make him a good citizen. And I am not convinced by the call for an Islamic “reformation.” The people who are calling for a Muslim Luther never read Luther. He was not liberal in any way and he was also an avowed anti-Semite. The idea of adapting Muslims to fit a Western context has nothing to do with theology; it is much more about the individual practices and endeavours of the Muslims themselves. They try to reconcile their practices with the Western environment, and they find the necessary tools for this within the environment. In the long run these changes will translate into theological reform of sorts, but it makes no sense to associate modernity with theological liberalism. To do this is either to distort history or to rely on wishful thinking.

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Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK

Muslim Integration into Western Cultures:

Between Origins and Destinations

Ronald Inglehart

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Institute for Social Research (ISR)

Pippa Norris

Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

March 1, 2009

HKS Working Paper No. RWP09-007

Abstract:

To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? The answer not only has important political implications; it also helps us understand the extent to which basic cultural values are enduring or malleable; and whether cultural values are traits of individuals or are attributes of a given society. Part I considers theories about the impact of growing social diversity in Western nations. We classify two categories of society: ORIGINS (defined as Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, including twenty nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (defined as Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, including twenty-two OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations). Using this framework, we demonstrate that on average, the basic social values of Muslim migrants fall roughly mid-way between those prevailing in their country of origin and their country of destination. We conclude that Muslim migrants do not move to Western countries with rigidly fixed attitudes; instead, they gradually absorb much of the host culture, as assimilation theories suggest.

Keywords: Human Rights, Intergovernmental Relations, International Affairs, Globalization, International Development, Political Science, immigration, muslim integration

Working Paper Series

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